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Securing Protections for Whistleblowers of 
Securities Fraud in the United States and the 
European Union 
 
Thomas C.R. Reynolds* 
 
Abstract 
 
The European Union is currently in the process of passing 
a regulation designed to strengthen protections and 
incentives for whistleblowers of securities fraud and other 
violations.  Proposal for a Regulation on Insider Dealing 
and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse) No. 2011/0295 
creates a framework that may protect whistleblowers from 
retaliation, incentivize them to blow the whistle, protect 
their confidential data and personal information, and 
require companies to set up compliance plans.  However, 
almost by definition, the Regulation's language is 
sufficiently broad to require efficient development in 
accordance with the supranational purposes. 
 
The United States has experience with whistleblower 
regulations and laws, and has recently implemented 
measures to address whistleblowers in securities cases.  
The purposes of this paper are to ask, discuss, and 
hopefully answer the question:  “With what issues should 
the European Union be concerned, and how should the 
E.U. or its Member States develop laws and regulations 
concerning whistleblowers of securities fraud?”  This 
paper uses two methods to analyze the issues relevant to 
whistleblowers of securities fraud or illegal securities 
transactions.  The first is the comparative method, applied 
                                                
*Thomas was a third-year law student of Chicago-Kent College of Law at the time of this writing. At 
the time of publication, he has graduated with certificates in Business Law, International & 
Comparative Law, and European and International Economic Law from a semester at the Universität 
Augsburg, where he drafted this note. 
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to the laws and regulations of the United States and the 
European Union.  The second is an economic analysis of 
the effects of the laws, in the hopes to find the most 
efficient solutions. 
 
Since the writing of this note in the summer of 2012, the 
Council of the European Union has debated this proposal 
and it is awaiting first reading in the EU Parliament, 
forecasted for September 10, 2013. 
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Securing Protections for Whistleblowers of 
Securities Fraud in the United States and the 
European Union  
 
Thomas C.R. Reynolds 
 
Introduction 
 
 Whistleblowers, according to Black's Law Dictionary, are employees 
who report employer wrongdoing to a governmental or law-enforcement 
agency.1  A more noble and idealistic description of a whistleblower is one 
“who no longer silently tolerate[s] illegal activities, maladministration or 
danger to humans, the environment and the economy, but reveal[s] those 
abuses within or outside their business, their company, their organization or 
their bureaucracy.”2  Of course, neither of these definitions is exactly 
correct.  Black's definition fails because a whistleblower's legal relationship 
with the reported subject may include other types of horizontal or vertical 
relationships; whistleblowers do not necessarily need to go straight to the 
government, sometimes they go to the company first.  Moreover, Strack's 
definition falls short because a whistleblower may, in fact, be motivated 
solely by financial rewards.  Regardless, the term ‘whistleblower’ - used 
since at least 19583 - is preferable to ‘snitch,’ ‘rat,’ or other words with 
negative connotations. 
 Whistleblowers of securities fraud face additional risks, and 
opportunities, due to the fluid characteristics of a security.  The nature of a 
security allows individuals more room to commit fraud and illegal 
manipulation.  A security is unlike a good, or even a unit of monetary 
currency.4  A company may create an infinite amount of securities with 
little if any cost.5  This is possible because securities represent a fraction of 
certain ownership rights tied in the company, such as the right to control, 
the right to seek dividends, and the right to other traditional property 
                                                
1 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1734 (9th ed. 2009).  
2 Guido Strack, Whistleblowing in Germany, in WHISTLEBLOWING 109, 110 (Marek Arszutowicz & 
Wojciech W. Gasparski eds., 2011). 
3 “The whistleblower on that $50,000 a month call-girl story was a witch, who tried to tap Bea Garfield, 
alleged madam, for $250.”  Mansfield News-Journal (Ohio) (October 10, 1958), 25. 
4 THOMAS L. HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION, 1 Law Sec. Reg. § 11, 1 (6th 
ed.) 
5 Id.  (“Securities can be issued in unlimited amounts and virtually without any costs since securities are 
nothing in themselves but rather represent only an interest in something else.”). 
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rights.6  This intangible and amorphous concept can be rather complex, 
allowing for creative fraud and manipulation.7 
 The regulation of securities began in thirteenth century England, 
around seven hundred and twenty-five years ago.8  King Edward I 
authorized securities brokers to practice their craft in London by issuing 
crown-sanctioned licenses.9  In the United States, President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt signed the first securities regulations laws in 1933, 
prompted by the securities fraud that contributed to the Great Depression.10 
A European Economic Community (“EEC”) directive in 1968 marked the 
first efforts of European securities regulations.11  However, the 1999 
Financial Services Action Plan was the first sign of real progress.12 
 This paper will look specifically at a number of laws:  1) the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200213 (hereafter known as “Sarbanes-Oxley” or 
“SOX”); 2) the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection 
Act14 (hereinafter known as “Dodd-Frank”); and 3) the Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Insider 
Dealing and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse)15 (henceforth known as 
“COM (2011) 651” or “Proposal for Regulation No. 2011/0295”). 
 
I. The Laws of the Lands 
 
A. The United States 
 
 The United States has five main federal securities laws:  1) Securities 
Act of 1933,16 2) Securities Exchange Act of 1934,17 3) Trust Indenture Act 
of 1939,18 4) Investment Company Act of 1940,19 and 5) Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940.20  In addition to these federal securities laws, 
                                                
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 2. 
8 THOMAS L. HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION, 1 Law Sec. Reg. § 12, 1 (6th 
ed. 2013). 
9 Statute of Edward I, in 1285; see STEPHEN KILLIK, THE WORK OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE 12 (2nd ed. 
1934). 
10 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. 
11 MANNING GILBERT WARREN III, EUROPEAN SECURITIES REGULATIONS 43 (1st ed. 2003). 
12 Id. at 5. 
13 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub.L. No. 107-204, 115 Stat. 745. 
14 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.L. No. 111-203, H.R. 4173 
(2010). 
15 COM (2011) 651 final (October 20, 2011). 
16 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. 
17 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. 
18 Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa - 77bbbb. 
19 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 - 80a-64. 
20 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 - 80b-21. 
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individual states have passed securities laws.  With regard to 
whistleblowers and securities, the United States has a comprehensive set of 
laws and regulations that both protect and incentivize whistleblowers.  This 
paper will focus on two relatively younger federal laws that have amended 
the above statutes in favor of whistleblowers. 
 
1. Sarbanes-Oxley (2002) 
 
 The Sarbanes-Oxley law amended all of the above statutes except for 
the Trust Indenture Act of 1939.  It added primarily to the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, and secondarily, to the Securities Act of 1933.  
Congress passed this law after the revelation of accounting and securities 
fraud committed by multinational corporations such as Enron and 
WorldCom in 2001.21  One of the purposes of SOX is to decrease 
shareholder fraud by expanding criminal penalties and other preventative 
measures.22  By passing SOX, Congress charged the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) and other federal agencies with 
implementing specific regulations to enforce the Act.  The relevant sections 
that deal with issues facing whistleblowers are: 1) Title III, Section 301(4) 
on Complaints to Public Company Audit Committees; and 2) Title VIII, 
Section 806 on Protection for Employees of Publicly Traded Companies 
Who Provide Evidence of Fraud. 
 Title III, Section 301 of SOX requires issuers of securities to use an 
“independent” audit committee, who happen to also be a part of the Board 
of Directors, when issuing securities.  Section 301(4) requires these 
independent audit committees to set up a confidential procedure for 
employees to complain or express their concerns over questionable 
accounting or auditing matters.  The issuer of securities may receive these 
complaints, but reserve some sort of confidentiality. 
 Title VIII, Section 806 of SOX amends Chapter 73 of Title 18, of the 
United States Code, to protect whistleblowers of securities fraud.  Section 
806(a) states that no publicly-traded company may “discharge, demote, 
suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an 
employee in the terms and conditions of employment because of any lawful 
act done by the employee.”  ‘Lawful acts’ in this context include providing 
information or assisting the government, the SEC, the company's 
compliance division, or other authoritative people or entities.  Another 
                                                
21 See Richard Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Whistleblower Provisions: Ten Years Later, 64 S.C. L. REV. 
1, 2 (2012). 
22 Id. at 3. 
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‘lawful act’ may be filing or complaining about alleged violations.23  These 
protections are intended to prevent employer retaliation against the 
employee.  If an employee who has “blown the whistle” believes his or her 
employer has retaliated against him or her, the employee may seek relief 
through an administrative court.24  If the administrative channels are not 
responsive, the employee may file a complaint through the normal federal 
court system.  Remedies can include general and special compensatory 
damages, and injunctive relief to reinstate the employee. 
 
2. Dodd-Frank (2010) 
 
 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
amended a variety of banking, company, and financial laws, including the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  Among other changes, Dodd-Frank 
established a whistleblower incentive program.  The incentive program can 
be described as a bounty program, similar to one the Internal Revenue 
Service established where informants may collect part of their neighbor's 
taxes if the neighbor was committing tax fraud.25  The Sections relevant to 
whistleblowers in Dodd-Frank are Sections 921 through 924, in Title IX on 
Investor Protections and Improvements to the Regulation of Securities. 
 Section 921 is the first section in Title IX, Subtitle B “Increasing 
Regulatory Enforcement and Remedies.”  It simply overrules any contract 
provision that may require binding arbitration when dealing with 
whistleblowers, whether made in an employment contract, a transactional 
contract, or any other agreement between two private parties.  Only by 
establishing the government's inherent authority to adjudicate these matters 
could it reach out to incentivize and protect future whistleblowers. 
 Amongst others, Section 922 establishes an incentive program to 
encourage future whistleblowers.  Whistleblowers may be eligible for a ten 
to thirty percent (10-30%) commission for original information that leads 
to a covered judicial or administrative action.  In order to define what is 
“original information,” Dodd-Frank established a three-prong test.  The test 
defines “original information” as 1) deriving from the independent 
knowledge of the whistleblower; 2) not known to the SEC, but if it is, the 
SEC will make an exception if the whistleblower is the source of the 
information; and 3) “not exclusively derived from an allegation made in a 
                                                
23 Violations of §§ 1341, 1343, 1344, 1348, SEC regulations or rules, or any federal shareholder fraud 
laws. 
24 Through the Department of Labor.  The cause of action could be based on the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act. 
25 Patrick A. Barthle, II, Whistling Rogues: A Comparative Analysis of the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower 
Bounty Program, 69 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1201, 1214 (2012). 
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judicial or administrative hearing,” unless the whistleblower is the source 
of the information.  “Covered judicial or administrative action(s)” are 
defined as cases brought by the SEC, whose cause(s) of action stems from 
US securities laws, and which result in penalties over one million dollars 
($1,000,000.00).  Further subsections describe the procedures for 
determining the amount of the award, accepting or denying awards, the 
discretion of the SEC, and the legal rights of a whistleblower vis-à-vis the 
SEC. 
 Section 922 also protects whistleblowers from retaliation and accords 
them confidentiality rights.  Retaliation, not just in Dodd-Frank, but also in 
employment discrimination and other areas of law, occurs when the 
company or employer treats the whistleblower employee worse as a result 
of his or her reporting of wrongdoing.  Specifically, employers may not, 
“discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly or indirectly, or in 
any other manner discriminate against, a whistleblower in the terms and 
conditions of employment” for 'blowing the whistle.'26  
 Section 923 simply amends the aforementioned Securities laws, as 
well as occasionally mentioning the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
 Section 924 directs the SEC to implement these rules into the federal 
regulations as Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (also 
known as “Regulation 21F” or “Section 240.21F”).  It also directs the SEC 
to establish a separate office for Section 21F issues.27 
 Regulation 21F, like most regulations, simply details the general 
rules the legislation passed.  Regulation 21F is also known as §§ 240.21F-1 
through 240.21F-17 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  Section 
240.21F-2 defines “whistleblower,” and adds to their anti-retaliation rules.  
Significantly, a whistleblower will be protected against retaliation even if 
he or she is not eligible for a monetary award.  Section 240.21F-3 repeats 
the eligibility requirements for an award, but the SEC interpreted § 
21F(a)(3)(c) to require a voluntary disclosure; the SEC also allows “related 
actions,” including state criminal cases.  Section 240.21F-5 emphasizes the 
SEC's discretion in deciding the amount of the award.  Section 240.21F-
5(c) states that if there is more than one whistleblower per case, the SEC 
will not give away more than 30% of the award; instead, it may award 10 
to 30% of the award to the aggregated whistleblowers.  In § 240.21F-6, the 
SEC lists optional factors it may consider in determining how much to 
award.  Sections 240.21F-9 through 240.21F-11 specify more eligibility 
                                                
26 Dodd-Frank Act § 922(h)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6. 
27 Currently this office is called the Office of the Whistleblower (see U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION,  OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER (2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/whistleblower.). 
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requirements, exceptions to eligibility, and the recommended 
whistleblowing procedures.  Section 240.21F-8(c)(3) exempts 
whistleblowers if they are “convicted of a criminal violation” related to the 
same information or action for which they would otherwise have been 
eligible for an award. 
 The Code of Federal Regulations describes the administrative history 
behind each regulation and how the SEC decided to craft them.28  For 
example, among the factors that may lower the financial award, the SEC 
included the culpability of the whistleblower, instead of per se excluding 
culpable whistleblowers.29  Even though this changed very little on the 
issue of whistleblower culpability, the SEC stated it did not believe that 
Congress intended a per se exclusion of culpable whistleblowers.30  
 
B. The European Union 
 
 The European Union's laws and regulations concerning 
whistleblowers of securities violations are not as comprehensive as those of 
the United States.  To begin, securities laws in the European Union have 
not yet been completely harmonized – each nation still retains some 
sovereignty over this area of law.  Even though there is an E.U. agency 
called the Committee of European Securities Regulators (“CESR”), the 
CESR is nowhere near as authoritative or powerful as the SEC is in the 
United States.31  However, the E.U. took a big step toward unifying the 
securities framework in 2007 by implementing the Market in Financial 
Instruments Directive.32  As for whistleblowing, the E.U. has only recently 
protected the act itself, although statutory law still remains on the national 
level.  To summarize, there are no supranational protections for 
whistleblowers, and most certainly none for whistleblowers of securities 
violations. 
 Within the past decade, however, there has been a movement toward 
encouraging and protecting whistleblowers within Europe – in the Council 
of Europe and the formal European Union.  In 2007, the so-called Group of 
States against Corruption (“GRECO”) presented a motion for a 
recommendation to the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly,33 
urging the Assembly to “decide[] to consider the question of 
                                                
28 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249 (2011). 
29 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6 (2011). 
30 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 21F-15, 21F-16 (2011). 
31 Tanja Boskovic, et al., Comparing European and U.S. Securities Regulations 2 (World Bank 
Working Paper No. 184, 2010). 
32 See id.; 2004/39/EC. 
33 The Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly is unrelated to the European Union or the Council 
of the European Union. 
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[whistleblowers'] protection and make appropriate recommendations.”34  In 
2009, the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights reported its study 
on whistleblowers to the Parliamentary Assembly.35  Finally in 2010, the 
Council passed a resolution urging member states to review their 
legislation concerning the protection of whistleblowers.36  
 In addition, from 2008 to 2011, a lawsuit was pending in the judicial 
channels of the European Union.  Ms. Brigitte Heinisch commenced a 
lawsuit against the nation of Germany for unfair dismissal and denial of her 
freedom of expression.37  Ms. Heinisch had worked for a private nursing 
home in Germany, which had some potentially criminal and civil 
liabilities.38  Ms. Heinisch complained about these problems and instituted 
a criminal investigation.39  Subsequently, she was dismissed from her job, 
allegedly in retaliation for “blowing the whistle.”40  The German courts did 
not grant her relief, so she commenced an action against the nation in the 
European Court of Human Rights.41  The Court held that there had been a 
violation of Ms. Heinisch's right to freedom of expression found in Article 
10, § 1 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms.42  Based on that decision, whistleblowing is 
protected under the E.U.'s right of freedom of expression. 
 
1. Proposal for Regulation No. 2011/0295 
 
 Currently, the European Parliament and the Council of the European 
Union, the E.U.'s two legislative bodies, are considering adopting a 
Regulation on insider dealing, market manipulation, and market abuse.43  
This Regulation would repeal Directive 2003/6/EC or the Market Abuse 
Directive (MAD).44  The proposed Regulation enhances the limited market 
abuse framework in the E.U., protects whistleblowers from retaliation, 
introduces an incentive system, and strengthens the confidentiality of the 
                                                
34 Eur. Parl. Ass., Protection of “whistle-blowers,” Doc. 11269 (2007) (Referring to Resolution 1507 
(2006), where the Parliamentary Assembly called member states to protect whistleblowers who disclose 
illegal activities within national governments.). 
35 Pieter Omtzigt, Report to the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, THE PROTECTION OF 
“WHISTLE-BLOWERS,” Doc. 12006 (2009).  
36 Eur. Parl. Ass., Res. 1729 (2010). 
37 Heinisch v. Germany, App. No. 28274/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2011). 
38 Id. at 3. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 4 
41 Id. at 5, 2. 
42 Id. at 19. 
43 COM (2011) 651. 
44 See 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2011/0295(COD). 
 210 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. Vol. XIII 
reporting system.45  Article 11 requires businesses to adopt a system to 
detect and prevent insider dealing and market manipulation; it also charges 
the European Securities and Markets Authority (“ESMA”) with developing 
regulations to ensure compliance.46  Article 21 protects the secrecy of “any 
confidential information received, exchanged or transmitted pursuant to 
this Regulation.”47  Article 22 similarly protects the personal information of 
the communicant, ensuring that authorities will comply with another data 
privacy Regulation.48  The information shall, at most, be deleted after five 
years. 
 Until Article 29, Proposal for Regulation No. 2011/0295 has only 
addressed issues tangentially related to whistleblowers and whistleblowing.  
Article 29, § 1 delegates the responsibility to Member States to institute 
“effective mechanisms” and provides a list of minimum components.  
Those include a process that acknowledges complaints and their follow-up, 
appropriate legal protections, protection of personal data, and a right to due 
process for the alleged wrongdoer.  Article 29, § 2 proposes a financial 
incentive program similar to that of Dodd-Frank.  It recommends that 
financial incentives be available for eligible people who offer new and 
“salient information” about “potential breaches” and leads to an imposition 
of administrative or criminal sanctions.  Unlike in Dodd-Frank, there is no 
requirement of a minimum amount of legal or administrative sanctions.49  
The European Regulation also does not require “independent knowledge” 
or the element of good will.50 
 
II. How Should the E.U. Construct its Legal Framework? 
 
 Before determining how the E.U. should construct its legal 
framework, the first question to ask is, “Why should the government 
protect whistleblowers of securities violations?”  The answer is, 
whistleblowers are in the best position to reduce the transactional costs and 
provide the most information.51  Protections and incentives for 
whistleblowers are necessary to prevent and address securities violations.52  
                                                
45 COM (2011) 651, at § 3.4.5.2. 
46 COM (2011) 651, art. 11. 
47 COM (2011) 651, art. 21. 
48 COM (2011) 651, art. 22. 
49 See Sec. 21F(a)(1). 
50 Contra 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F(a)(3). 
51 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and Of the Council on Insider Dealing 
and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse), COM (2011) 651 final, ¶ 36 (Oct. 29, 2011) [hereinafter 
COM (2011)].; Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse, Luigi Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate 
Fraud?, LXV J. Fin. 2213, 2251 (2010) ("Employees,  industry regulators, and analysts gather a lot of 
relevant information as a byproduct of  their normal work . . . and are in a much better position to 
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 An alternative may be to give the shareholders and recipients of 
fraudulent securities a strong cause of action or a right to bring a private 
lawsuit to court such as a shareholder derivate suit.  After all, shareholders 
are the owners of the company, have access to company information, and 
are owed fiduciary duties from its agents.  However, this causes collective 
action problems.  With possibly hundreds or thousands of shareholders, any 
one individual will not feel responsible for investigating and preventing 
fraud.  Those individuals or companies defrauded will, ex post, likely have 
the initiative to investigate, but possibly not the necessary resources or 
ability.  This may, in turn, cause an increase in litigation, predatory hunting 
of smaller and unsophisticated investors in securities, and individuals who 
take advantage of investors, like Bernie Madoff. 
 Even if the shareholders were to appoint agents such as the Board of 
Directors or an Auditing Committee, a whistleblower incentive program 
led by government could be in many cases a more efficient system.  In 
addition, this incentive system is less invasive in company affairs than a 
possible Regulation that would require even privately-held companies to 
appoint Auditing Committees. 
Proponents of the Coase Theorem may argue that the market should 
equal out inefficiencies.53  However, there are significant transactional 
costs for companies to acquire the necessary information.  The Coase 
Theorem relies on the assumptions that the parties have no transactional 
costs and have perfect knowledge.  Those assumptions being impossible, 
the Coase Theorem cannot stand.  Therefore, without an acceptable 
alternative, governments and legal systems must continue to rely on 
whistleblowers. 
 
A. The Issue of Data Protection and Procedural Safeguards 
 
 To create an effective whistleblower system, the European Union 
must establish legal and technological systems to protect the data and 
personal information of a whistleblower.  The E.U. already has a directive 
and a committee within the European Commission designed to protect the 
personal data of individuals.54  The new whistleblower law must comply 
with this E.U. directive, and the new law should consider the agency’s 
                                                                                                             
identify fraud than short sellers, security sellers, or lawyers, for whom detecting fraud is like looking for 
a needle in the haystack."). 
52 COM (2011), supra note 51, ¶ 39.   
53 The Coase Theorem posits that if there are no transactional costs (such as no taxes, perfect 
information, and other barriers to trade), a transaction will be efficient, regardless of the externalities, or 
unintended effects. 
54 Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 1 (EC). 
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suggestions, the most important of which are found in Working Paper 
117.55  Without safe and stable procedures, a whistleblower will be more 
hesitant to come forward with valuable information because of the higher 
risks involved.  However, in crafting a system, the E.U. must take into 
account that some systems have already run into legal problems in member 
states such as Germany and France.  In Germany, a state court called into 
question the legal validity of a whistleblower telephone hotline and the 
onerous duties imposed on company employees.56 
 Aside from technologically advanced computer systems, there are at 
least three basic structures the E.U. can institute or require companies to 
institute.57  First, the E.U. can create an anonymous message reception 
through telephone or email.58  This would be beneficial to society because 
it would likely increase the number of whistleblowers and identify possibly 
unlawful situations.  However, a French court in 2005 declared similar 
systems to be unlawful because anonymous collection could increase the 
risk of false information, and violate an employee's fundamental freedoms 
if that employee is the subject of the complaint.59  This type of system 
would also limit the government or the company's ability to follow-up and 
obtain more information.  Whistleblowers may know of important 
information that they consider irrelevant, or they may be unaware of the 
significance of their information.   
Furthermore, this system presents evidentiary problems. Courts 
would be unlikely to admit a piece of information that has been 
anonymously submitted if the government cannot establish a foundation for 
the evidence through testimony or other means. 
A second type of system that addresses the problem of follow-up 
would be a system with a backchannel.60  Backchannels let two parties 
communicate in real-time, and an individual may set up a mailbox for the 
reception of messages (i.e. think of Facebook, Gmail Chat, or Skype).  The 
benefit of this system is that it protects the identity of the whistleblower 
while allowing the government or company to obtain further information, if 
the whistleblower continues to follow-up.  The cost, however, is in the 
whistleblower not complying further.  Courts and companies may still not 
                                                
55 See Cooper & Marttila, infra note 59. 
56 Judgment of Jun. 15, 2005, 5 BV 20/05, NZA-RR 2005, 476 (Arbeitsgericht Wuppertal [Labor Court 
in Wuppertal]). 
57 Strack, supra note 2, ¶ 26. 
58 Id. 
59 McDonald's, CNIL Délibération No 2005-110 (May 26 2005); Exide Techs., CNIL Decision No 
2005-111 (May 26 2005); see also Daniel P. Cooper and Helena Marttila, Corporate Whistleblowing 
Hotlines and EU data Protection Laws, PRACTICAL LAW COMPANY (June 14, 2012, 16:53), 
http://us.practicallaw.com/1-366-2987?q=whistleblowing. 
60 Strack, supra note 2, ¶ 26. 
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take the information seriously because it has been submitted anonymously.  
This also creates the moral hazard mentioned in the first system:  An 
anonymous system may be abused by individuals who lie about or invent 
the information they submit.  The two anonymous systems mentioned also 
deprive others from the chance of examining the whistleblower and 
determining whether he or she is a credible witness.  Once again, an 
anonymous system may run into similar legal troubles as mentioned above. 
The third system that Strack identifies is an ombudsman system.61  
An ombudsman system involves the whistleblower meeting with an 
independent third party who receives the information.  The third party may 
be a lawyer, sometimes in-house counsel, a journalist, a bureaucrat, or 
other individual.  A benefit of this system is that it allows for the 
examination of whistleblowers, along with his or her credibility.  However, 
this would certainly discourage some whistleblowers for fear of reprisal 
and mistrust of the ombudsman.  The ombudsman may also be vulnerable 
to corruption or regulatory “capture” by large companies and special 
interest groups. 
The United States established a hybrid system in Sarbanes-Oxley.62 
SOX charges an Audit Committee, which is part of the Board of Directors, 
with the safekeeping of whistleblower complaints.63  As such, this possibly 
fourth system is like an ombudsman system, but without the crucial 
independence of the third party.  The Audit Committee is also a way to 
receive anonymous messages because the SEC establishes this as a 
minimum standard for public companies and some private companies.  
Indeed, SOX also imposed a legal duty on the company's Board of 
Directors to keep the submissions confidential and anonymous.64  The 
benefit of the Audit Committee is that it reduces costs by delegating the 
responsibility to the company, thereby saving and optimizing the most 
efficient use of judicial and governmental resources.  On the downside, a 
conflict of interest exists because the primary duties of both the Audit 
Committee and the Board of Directors belong to the company, not to the 
whistleblowers.  A strong cause of action against employer retaliation may 
reduce this problem, but this system will nevertheless discourage some 
whistleblowers and raise the risk of greater conspiracies involving the 
former whistleblower(s), digging the grave even deeper. 
 Considering the pros and cons of each system, no single system 
clearly stands out from the rest.  Europe had legal problems with SOX's 
                                                
61 Id. 
62 See § 301. 
63 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10A(m)(4); 14 U.S.C.A. § 78 (West 2012).  
64 Id. § 10A(m)(4)(B). 
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requirement of an anonymous reception of complaints because of the 
potential for infringing the fundamental freedoms of the person being 
discussed.65  However, the E.U.’s Article 29 Working Party may have 
reconciled these contradicting requirements by suggesting that corporations 
only need to encourage employees to identify themselves on a confidential 
basis when submitting reports.66 
 Europe may wish to adopt a mixed system tailored to their needs, 
which delegates certain responsibilities to nations and corporations.  Each 
member state's culture is slightly different, and cultural attitudes to 
whistleblowing may “lead us to suspect some diversity in optimal 
whistleblower-policy.”67  Indeed, nations that have histories with 
dictatorships and secret police are much more hesitant to accept the 
whistleblower as noble.  Legal systems must account for this when 
designing the procedural and substantive provisions of a whistleblower 
system.  In the next section, the incentive system, which may encourage a 
hesitant whistleblower to overcome his cultural prejudices, will be 
discussed. 
 Nevertheless, an ombudsman system (the third system presented) 
may be a good beginning because it allows for the confidentiality of 
whistleblowers across Europe.  This system allows for an examination of 
the whistleblower, provides an efficient centralized resource, and is more 
likely to pass legal rigor in nations such as France and Germany.  The E.U. 
has an established securities agency, called the European Securities and 
Markets Authority (“ESMA”), which could serve as a platform for 
enforcement, similar to the SEC's role in the United States.  However, the 
European Commission68 or its Internal Market and Services Directorate 
General (“DG MARKT”)69 are more likely to serve as regulators. 
 
B. The Issue of an Incentive System 
 
 The second major issue this paper will discuss is that of the incentive 
system.  Incentive or bounty systems, like the False Claims Act qui tam 
actions,70 encourage whistleblowers to blow the whistle by offering an 
                                                
65 Cooper & Marttila, supra note 59, at 10. 
66 Id. 
67 Anthony Heyes & Sandeep Kapur, An Economic Model of Whistle-Blower Policy, 25 J. L. ECON. & 
ORG. 157, 159 (2009). 
68 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE EU SINGLE MARKET:  SECURITIES (2013), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/index_en.htm. 
69 Id. 
70 Qui tam is short for the Latin phrase “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte 
sequitur,” which means, “who as well for the king as for himself sues in this matter.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1368 (9th ed. 2009). 
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award, usually financial, for the successful completion of a judicial action.  
In the carrot-stick approach, these awards are the quintessential carrots.  
These systems bring in the benefits of private justice because insiders 
possess more and better information, but they allow the government to 
prosecute and prevent vigilantism.  The United States implemented an 
incentive system for securities fraud in 2010 as part of the Dodd-Frank 
Act.71  
The Dodd-Frank incentive system was partially based on similar 
programs hosted by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”)72 and it 
strengthens the whistleblower protections under the False Claims Act.73  In 
comparison, the E.U. Regulation delegates the responsibility to set up this 
system nationally.  However, the E.U. may wish to consider a supranational 
incentive system not only to further integrate, but also to pool the financial 
resources and incentivize more whistleblowers.74 
 Psychologically, a whistleblower is driven to blow the whistle on 
his/her employer(s), partner(s), or business associate(s) for a variety of 
reasons.75  Chief amongst them, one may presume, is a potential financial 
award. 76  “There is no question that human beings do react to the carrot and 
the stick.  However, people are not blindly mechanical cost-benefit 
machines.”77  Of course, people are not influenced solely by financial 
rewards; in fact, some whistleblowers are also motivated by the elements of 
duty78 and legitimacy.79  Even though incentive or bounty programs 
primarily motivate whistleblowers' financial interests, non-financial and 
psychological elements have a bearing on the economic analysis, and the 
legal consequences. 
                                                
71 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2010). 
72 26 U.S.C. § 7623(a) began as a potential award in 1867, at the discretion of the IRS.  In 2006, the Tax 
Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 fundamentally changed the provision, taking away the discretionary 
power of the IRS.  Thomas J. Oulin, and Richard R. Zabel, IRS Whistleblower Provision, ROBINS, 
KAPLAN, MILLER & CIRESI L.L.P. (Dec. 2007/Jan. 2008), 
http://www.rkmc.com/~/media/PDFs/IRS%20Whistleblower%20Provision.pdf. 
73 Id. 
74 The downside to that is that the some nations will inevitably attempt to take advantage of this 
financial pool, in the author’s opinion. 
75 Dave Ebersole, Blowing the Whistle on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions, 6 OHIO ST. 
ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 123, 124 (2011). 
76 See Geoffrey C. Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and 
Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91, 113 (2007)(“Presumably, a large enough 
financial  benefit in favour of blowing  the whistle could outweigh any social or psychological 
factors.”). 
77 Lawrence M. Friedman, Coming of Age: Law and Society Enters an Exclusive Club, 1 ANN. REV. 
LAW SOC. SCI. 1, 14 (2005). 
78 Ebersole even argues that laws imposing an affirmative duty on people will create more 
whistleblowers.  Ebersole, supra note 75, at 135. 
79 Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards, 
Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1184 (2010). 
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1. Prerequisites and Eligibility 
 
 In order to receive an award, the European Union's proposal requires 
the whistleblower to first provide salient and new information.80  But the 
U.S.'s Dodd-Frank Act requires only “original information.”81  Original 
information is further defined as:  1) “independent knowledge or analysis,” 
2) not known to the commission, and 3) not derived from a hearing, audit, 
investigation, etc.; the definition also makes an exception for the original 
sources of the information.82   
The E.U. and U.S. definitions are similar, but have two major 
differences.  First, the E.U.'s use of the word “salient” suggests significant 
and useful information, but the U.S. wording has no such requirement.83,84  
The E.U.'s requirement raises the bar for whistleblowers to receive an 
award, perhaps deterring innocent whistleblowers with insignificant 
information because they may not consider their information to be 
“salient.”  The bigger concern, however, is that it may deter whistleblowers 
with some fault in the matter being reported.  But, a whistleblower is 
unlikely to expose himself or herself by reporting insignificant information 
and hoping for an award.  If a whistleblower comes forward, they do so 
either accepting the SEC's legitimacy (in the U.S.), from a sense of duty, or 
with a determination to win that award.  A reasonable person would not 
believe that providing insignificant information will payoff.   
The second major difference is an exception to the general rule that 
the U.S. and the E.U. prefer information they do not already possess.  The 
U.S. makes an exception for the second whistleblower who comes forth to 
them (or third, fourth, etc.) if he or she is the original source of the 
information they give.  This is a clever incentive to encourage those 
committing fraud to defect, even if some whistleblowers have already come 
clean.  The effects of the rest of Dodd-Frank are unclear,85 but the incentive 
divides itself as more whistleblowers come forward.86   
                                                
80 COM (2011), supra note 51, art. 29, § 2. 
81 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act , 12 U.S.C. 5301 § 922 (2010) 
(amending The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78a § 21). 
82 Id. 
83 The SEC did not add this requirement under “original information.”  Original Information, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 34300, 34310 (Jun. 13, 2011) (amending 17 C.F.R §§ 240 and 249). 
84 Further research may uncover that courts have narrowed the definition to include substantial or 
important information. 
85 “The United States experience with the Dodd-Frank Act is too nascent to allow for many lessons to 
be drawn. However, it will be worthwhile to monitor how the bounty provisions work.”  Nicholas 
Mavrakis & Michael Legg, Whistleblower Bounties a Novel Financial Reform, 40 AUS. BUS. L.REV. 
26, 41 (2012). 
86 See Amount of Award, 76 Fed. Reg. at 34329-31 (June 13, 2011). 
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A similar provision may deter European whistleblowers if they 
thought they may have to share the award (it would change their 
cost/benefit analysis); however, this is less likely to be significant when the 
E.U. Regulation does not give any numbers which can help a whistleblower 
calculate his potential monetary benefits if he or she chooses to blow the 
whistle.  Therefore, the E.U.'s specific language is probably insignificant, 
and perhaps the E.U. does not want to adopt the U.S.'s exception if it does 
not adopt some formula for the award.  But even if the E.U. does adopt a 
financial cost/benefit calculus, the U.S. exception may not have such a 
significant effect on the quantity or quality of whistleblowers. 
In addition, the E.U. specifies that the information must be about 
potential breaches, but the U.S. has no such explicit requirement.  The 
SEC's action, however, must be brought under “the securities laws” and 
must cause a successful result.  There is no obvious difference to the 
language and practices here. 
The E.U.'s third requirement is that the information, “result[] in the 
imposition of an administrative sanction,” administrative measure, or 
criminal sanction.87  The SEC must also use the information in a judicial, 
administrative, or related action for a whistleblower to receive an award.88  
Beyond that, a court must sanction the fraud participants at least 
$1,000,000.00.89  It is foreseeable that the U.S.'s glass floor may deter 
whistleblowers of smaller fraud to allow the amount to increase over time.  
After all, if the conspiracy is for $800,000, the whistleblower may wait 
until it goes above $1,000,000 to report the fraud.  On the other hand, 
ESMA may not even wish to be burdened by such small schemes.  EMSA 
may wish to consider a minimum money award, depending on the 
workload to enforce the Regulation.  However, as it stands, this should 
encourage more whistleblowers and discourage the growth of individual 
conspiracies. 
The E.U. Regulation explicitly prohibits the whistleblower from 
having a pre-existing legal or contractual duty to report information.  The 
U.S. does not explicitly prohibit this, but Dodd-Frank exempts certain 
information found in situations such as during audits or investigations.90  
The Dodd-Frank list leaves the possibility of being under-inclusive.  The 
ideal statutory language would include a list, like that of Dodd-Frank, but 
with open-ended language, like the E.U. Regulation. 
 
                                                
87 Further research will address the Regulation's criminal sanctions as a “stick” versus Dodd-Frank's 
notable lack of criminal sanctions. 
88 12 U.S.C. 5301 § 922 (2010) (amending 15 U.S.C. 78a §§ 21F(a)(1) and 21F(a)(5)). 
89 Id. 
90 12 U.S.C. 5301 § 922 (2010) (amending 15 U.S.C. 78a § 21F(a)(3)(C)). 
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2. Awards 
 
 For a whistleblower motivated by financial interests, the award is 
perhaps the most important element.  Feldman and Lobel found that some 
whistleblowers are motivated by duty and legitimacy.91  This is revealing 
when one considers the history of much of Europe.  Germany, for example, 
has been plagued by two dictatorships that used spies and informants to 
repress the nation.  Guido Strack identifies one obstacle that needs to be 
overcome:  the “psychological hurdles and the culture of silence, non-
interference and misunderstood loyalty.”92  A change in culture is a long-
term solution, but a short-term one is through financial incentives.  No 
matter the culture, financial incentives work.93 
 To tap into this short-term solution, Europe's regulations should be 
tested until finding the optimal setting.  Currently, COM (2011) 651 makes 
awards a discretionary power of the proper authority.94  Furthermore, COM 
(2011) 651 does not give any clue or suggestions as to how the authorities 
may determine the award amount.  Because of this uncertainty in award 
amount, whistleblowers motivated by monetary incentives will likely be 
discouraged from coming forward.  Radically, Dodd-Frank requires the 
SEC pay an award if the criteria discussed above are met.95  Furthermore, 
the award to the whistleblower or group of whistleblowers will be between 
ten and thirty percent of the monetary sanction under Dodd-Frank.96   
Under the American system, whistleblowers may calculate their 
costs and benefits.  Assuming the award is lucrative enough, this is a better 
system to attract more financially-minded whistleblowers.  Considering the 
cultural hurdles in Europe, the E.U. and/or its member states may wish to 
rely on these kinds of whistleblowers and make the necessary changes. 
Another running concern of whistleblowers is the legitimacy of the 
award and the agency.  Guido Strack argues that German whistleblowers 
may not report indiscretions because Germans generally believe that harm 
will not be eliminated even if he or she sends a message.97  Similarly, 
businessmen in general may naturally mistrust the government and worry 
                                                
91 See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 79, at 1202. 
92 Strack, supra note 2, ¶ 27.  
93 See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 79, at 1202; Justin R. Blount & Spencer Markel, The End of the 
Internal Compliance World as We Know It, or an Enhancement of the Effectiveness of Securities Law 
Enforcement? Bounty Hunting Under the Dodd-Frank Act's Whistleblower Provisions, 17 FORDHAM  J. 
CORP. & FIN. L. 1023, 1028 (2012) (“ . . . bounty schemes . . . survive for one reason- they work. The 
bounty model is a win-win-model."). 
94 COM (2011), supra note 51, art. 29, § 2.  
95 12 U.S.C. 5301 § 922 (2010) (amending 15 U.S.C. 78a § 21F(b)). 
96 12 U.S.C. 5301 § 922 (2010) (amending 15 U.S.C. 78a § 21F(b)(1)). 
97 Strack, supra note 2, ¶ 27. 
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that the award may not be duly granted.  Therefore, it is imperative in both 
the E.U. and the U.S. that the agencies:  1) address suspicions, messages, 
and complaints, and 2) rightfully award deserving whistleblowers. 
 
C. The Issue of Whistleblower Immunity 
 
 The final legal issue deals more with the government's use of a 
'stick,' rather than a 'carrot.'  Whistleblowing is not a one-time event, 
because oftentimes, the whistleblower wishes to continue working for the 
same company.  However, this may present difficulties, as employers will 
likely resent the whistleblower for his or her actions.  “Moreover, 
whistleblower[s] may fear blacklisting from future employers who suspect 
disloyalty, as well as social ostracism from their coworkers.”98  At this 
point, government should intervene to protect whistleblowers who not only 
accurately divulged securities violations, but also may have mistakenly 
reported a violation. 
 If the E.U. wants to encourage whistleblowers, it will have to protect 
them ex post facto.  Proposal for Regulation No. 2011/0295's retaliation 
protection is left wanting.99  Member states should institute “[a]ppropriate 
protection[s] for persons who report potential or actual breaches.”100  Dodd-
Frank's protection of whistleblowers is more comprehensive, but restricts 
only actions of the employer “in the terms and conditions of 
employment.”101, 102, 103  These provisions in effect establish a protection 
against employer retaliation.  However, due to the nature of retaliation, it is 
very difficult to prove.  A crucial element is to prove that the employer was 
motivated to discriminate against the employee because the employee had 
blown the whistle.  Thus, a simple private right of action may not be 
sufficient to protect the whistleblower.      
 The E.U. could solve this problem if it were to adopt stronger legal 
protections against retaliation.  In fact, the E.U. may have already bound 
itself to strong protections against retaliation, and perhaps stronger 
protections against securities retaliation.  In Heinisch v. Germany, the 
European Court of Human Rights recognized whistleblowing as part of a 
                                                
98 Rapp, supra note 76, at 95. 
99 See COM (2011), supra note 51, art. 29, § 2. 
100 Id. 
101 12 U.S.C. 5301 § 922 (2010) (amending 15 U.S.C. 78a § 21F(h)(1)(A)). 
102 Similar protections and almost identical language can be found in the United States' Title VII 
protections against employment discrimination based on fundamental characteristics such as race, 
gender, national origin, religion.  The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 21 (1964).   
103 For various cultural and constitutional reasons, the United States adopted a relatively restrained 
protection that relies mainly on the individual's capabilities to survive the potential retaliation, in the 
author’s opinion. 
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European's fundamental freedom of expression found in the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.104  The Court 
paid particular attention to the Council of Europe's recommendations and 
the Revised European Social Charter's provisions protecting against 
employer/employment retaliation.105  Thus, we see here statutory 
protections within an eventual judicial protection.  And even though the 
Court primarily held that whistle blowing is a fundamental freedom, it may 
have said in dicta (or even in a secondary holding) that the public is 
certainly concerned with information on crimes that take advantage of 
people who, “may not be in a position to draw attention to 
shortcomings.”106  Therefore, the complex nature of securities fraud may be 
prime ground for legislative initiatives and legal suits if not properly 
addressed. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The European Union has some hurdles to overcome in order to 
effectively encourage and protect whistleblowers.  Chief amongst them are: 
1) legal, logistical, and political barriers to data privacy and transmission; 
2) cultural biases against 'informants'; 3) financial accounting and 
experimentation; and 4) ex post facto legal protections for those who have 
already blown the whistle.  These challenges, however, provide 
opportunities for the E.U. to further consolidate and integrate by 
developing its securities laws and agencies, pooling financial resources, 
and generally developing together in one direction, around one common 
idea.  The E.U. should not necessarily emulate the United States, but 
should learn from the U.S.'s experiences and borrow from its strengths 
while avoiding its weaknesses.  In order to reach this goal, further research 
could concentrate on the effective use of criminal sanctions against white-
collar criminals, the U.S.'s qui tam programs of the False Claims Act and 
the IRS, anti-retaliation measures related to Title VII employment 
discrimination, and whistleblowers in anti-trust regulation in the United 
States and the European Union. 
 
                                                
104 Heinisch v. Germany, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶¶ 94-95. 
105 Id. at ¶¶ 37, 38. 
106 Id. at ¶ 71. 
